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Abstract
Linguistic acceptability judgments are widely agreed to reflect constraints on real-time
language processing. Nonetheless, very little is known about how processing costs affect ac-
ceptability judgments. In this paper, we explore how processing limitations are manifested in
acceptability judgment data. In a series of experiments, we consider how two factors relate to
judgments for sentences with varying degrees of complexity: (1) the way constraints combine
(i.e., additively or super-additively), and (2) the way a comprehender’s memory resources in-
fluence acceptability judgments. Results indicate that multiple sources of processing difficulty
can combine to produce super-additive effects, and that there is a positive linear relationship
between reading span scores and judgments for sentences whose unacceptability is attributable
to processing costs. These patterns do hold for sentences whose unacceptability is attributable
to factors other than processing costs, e.g. grammatical constraints. We conclude that tests of
(super)-additivity and of relationships to reading span scores can help to identify the effects
of processing difficulty on acceptability judgments, although these tests cannot be used in
contexts of extreme processing difficulty.
Keywords: sentence processing, acceptability judgments, grammar, individual differences,
working memory
1 Introduction
Acceptability judgments are the primary source of evidence that linguists use to design theories of
grammar. George Miller once noted in an address that “the form of the grammar is settled on for
very good reasons, but for reasons that do not attempt to take account of any data other than pri-
mary linguistic intuitions” (Miller 1975). What these intuitions or judgments imply about linguistic
knowledge, however, is not straightforward. A rich history of research in linguistics and psychol-
ogy, dating back to Miller and Chomsky (1963) (and predated by Saussure’s (1916) langue-parole
distinction), makes it clear that judgments of linguistic acceptability are colored by “performance”
factors – limitations on cognitive resources and usage (Chomsky 1965; Bever 1970; Watt 1970;
Pylyshyn 1973; Pritchett 1992, inter alia). On the standard view that linguistic competence is a
stable system of knowledge that is independent of performance factors, this makes judgments of
acceptability naturally ambiguous. Any contrast in acceptability judgments between two sentences
may reflect principles of grammar, limitations on sentence processing, or both.1
If linguists are to continue using judgments as the primary evidence for building grammatical
theories, being able to identify and understand effects of processing difficulty on judgments serves
an important function. For instance, if it was apparent that an acceptability contrast is largely
attributable to processing differences, a grammatical constraint to explain that same contrast may
well be otiose (Bever, Carroll, & Hurtig 1976). Moreover, if the objective is to “see the grammar
bare” (Gleitman & Gleitman 1970), that is, unobscured by other confounding factors in acceptability
judgment data, then there is a clear imperative to sharpen our understanding of how processing
complexity bears on intuitions of well-formedness (Schu¨tze 1996).
Knowing when acceptability differences are at least partly attributable to contrasts in processing
costs would also inform some long-standing debates in linguistics. For example, in the study of sen-
tences with “island violations” – sentences where a linguistic dependency in a particular syntactic
configuration is judged to be unacceptable – both processing factors and grammatical constraints
have been proposed to account for the unacceptability (Ross 1967; Chomsky 1973, 1977, 1981, 1986;
Kluender 1992, 1998; Kluender & Kutas 1993; Phillips 2006; Hofmeister & Sag 2010; Sprouse, Wa-
gers, & Phillips 2012; Hofmeister, Jaeger, Arnon, Sag, & Snider 2013; Hofmeister, Staum Casasanto,
& Sag in press; Sprouse & Hornstein In press). Generally speaking, knowing when processing dif-
ferences are at play in acceptability contrasts is an essential ingredient to a more comprehensive
understanding of the relationship between formal and functional factors.
In this vein, our objective here is to follow the admonition of Schu¨tze (1996, p. 9): “linguists
ought to study their methodology . . . Eliminating or controlling for confounding factors requires
us to have some idea of what those factors might be, and such an understanding can only be
gained by a systematic study of the judgment process.” In the present case, even though there is a
general consensus that processing costs enter into estimations of acceptability, relatively little else
is known about how processing costs map onto acceptability judgments. To take the easy way out,
we could blanketly assume that effects of processing costs on judgments will parallel their effects in
other empirical domains. That is, we might take the bold but unsupported position that wherever
processing differences exist (however we measure them), acceptability differences will as well, and
that the direction and magnitude of processing differences will be faithfully reflected in acceptability
1Exogenous factors may also play a role in judgment variation, as detailed by Schu¨tze (1996).
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differences. But this overlooks the very real possibility that judgment tasks differ not only in their
degree of sensitivity to processing costs but also the kinds of processing costs they reflect, and the
existing evidence already hints that greater processing complexity many not always be realized as
lower acceptability (Frazier 1985; Gibson & Thomas 1999; Fanselow & Frisch 2004; Sprouse 2009).
This leads to the following question: how can we know whether processing differences contribute
to an acceptability contrast? Assuming that processing differences are realized as acceptability
differences because of processing limitations, we arrive at a slightly modified version of the
preceding question that becomes the central focus of this article: how are processing limitations
manifested in acceptability judgment tasks? By ‘limitations’, we refer to either the finiteness of a
set of available resources or processing bottlenecks, i.e. some processes may be constrained to begin
only after others have finished (Welford 1952; Pashler 1994; Pashler & Johnston 1998; Ferreira &
Pashler 2002). A consequence of these limitations is that a sufficient level of processing difficulty
can (temporarily) exhaust these resources, leading to a processing breakdown and/or significant
delays (Gibson 1991).
We approach these questions from the following perspective: there are general indicators of
limitations to processing resources which apply across various methodologies. One is the observation
of so-called super-additive effects, where two stimulus properties or tasks combine to have an effect
on a dependent variable that surpasses the sum of their independent effects. According to the logic of
the additive factors model (Sternberg 1969), super-additive effects indicate that two processes draw
on the same limited pool of resources. For instance, Fedorenko, Gibson, and Rohde (2007) found
that reading harder-to-process sentences (e.g. sentences with object relative clauses vs. subject
relative clauses) while simultaneously doing complex arithmetic tasks (made harder than easier
arithmetic tasks by making the addends larger) slows reading rates down super-additively. They
conclude that the two tasks draw on the same pool of cognitive resources. Evidence of super-
additivity, therefore, suggests that the task demands stress the limits of the relevant cognitive
system, whether those limitations involve a finite set of resources, processing bottlenecks, or both.
To be clear, though, the absence of super-additive effects does not imply that the relevant pool of
resources is unlimited. Even if some set of cognitive resources are limited, simultaneous demands
may together make proportionately little demand on the system. Signs of processing limitations
thus only emerge in the form of super-additive effects when the combined demands exceed a critical
threshold. Moreover, because the cognitive demands must interact with one another, they must
overlap to some significant extent within a sufficiently narrow window of time.
Second, we assume that correlations between measures of individual differences in neuropsy-
chological assessments, such as one of the variety of memory span tasks, and performance on a
secondary task (e.g. a reading or acceptability task) indicate the extent of cognitive limitations on
the secondary task. The more that the secondary task calls upon the resources measured by the
neuropsychological assessment, the stronger the correlation will be. The nature of those limitations
depends upon what aspects of cognition (e.g. memory, attention, task switching, spatial reasoning,
etc.) the neuropsychological assessment actually measures. For language processing, numerous
researchers have proposed that the resources available for language processing differ from one indi-
vidual to the next, and that this variation can explain the magnitude of syntactic complexity effects
(King & Just 1991; Just & Carpenter 1992; King & Kutas 1995).2 As with super-additivity, the
2There is a more nuanced and orthogonal debate about whether the resources used for language processing overlap
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absence of a correlation between scores from some neuropsychological test and a psycholinguistic
task clearly does not entail unlimited processing resources or that functional factors are irrelevant
for the task.
Our strategy here is to assess whether and how these indicators of processing limitations relate to
judgments for sentences with varying degrees of complexity. In light of the wealth of preceding work
on the role of memory constraints in determinations of processing complexity, we focus primarily
on processing costs standardly attributed to memory retrieval in language processing. We leave
aside processing costs due to probabilistic factors such as word or phrase expectancy, even though
these factors may be as, if not more, important than considerations of memory retrieval in real-time
language processing. It is a matter for future research to determine whether the results we report
here generalize to other sources of processing difficulty besides memory costs.
As a comparison set for the complex sentences, we examine cases where acceptability differences
are not generally taken to reflect online processing costs. More specifically, we look at cases similar
to (1) below:
(1) a. I embarrassed him.
b. I embarrassed he.
The acceptability difference between (1a) and (1b) is widely seen as being causally related to
factors other than processing complexity. The standard characterization here involves the notion
of ‘grammar’; however, in what follows, our primary aim is not to set up a contrast between
grammar and processing. Instead, the aim is to juxtapose phenomena where the causal agent
in acceptability differences is or is not online sentence processing complexity. Beyond the fact
that examples like (1) and other similar cases we test below are classically treated in terms other
than processing complexity, there are principled reasons for presuming that processing costs are
not what separates the examples in (1).3 The examples above are short, involve frequent lexical
items, express plausible events, and while case-marking acts as an indicator of thematic role, such
information is independently recoverable from word order cues in English. Thus, a possible meaning
for (1b) is not difficult to surmise. In the end, readers will be convinced of our claims about
how processing complexity affects judgments to the extent that they believe that the acceptability
difference between examples like (1a) & (1b) pertains to considerations besides differential processing
complexity.
For each type of stimulus — those varying in complexity and those varying in grammaticality
— two properties of the corresponding judgment data are examined in accord with the above
discussion. First, we consider what happens when multiple sources of unacceptability combine in
the same sentence. Logically, three distinct outcomes could result from combining multiple sentence
features that each individually lower acceptability ratings:
– a penalty significantly smaller than the sum of the two individual penalties, a result which we
refer to as under-additive;
with the resources used in other cognitive tasks (Just & Carpenter 1992; Caplan & Waters 1999). We opt to not
enter these deep waters.
3This leaves open the possibility that the realization of case-marking distinctions, historically speaking, depends
upon functional considerations.
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– a penalty statistically indistinguishable from the sum of the two individual penalties, which
we refer to as additive;
– a penalty significantly larger than the sum of the two individual penalties, which we call
super-additive.
Accordingly, we test here how online processing costs (PCs) combine with each other to lower
judgments, how grammatical constraint violations (GCVs) combine with each other, and how the
two sources of unacceptability affect judgments when they co-occur in the same sentence.
Some preceding work already confirms that participants take into account multiple GCVs in
their judgments of acceptability. Sorace and Keller (2005), for instance, illustrate how the ratings
for a sentence become progressively lower as more GCVs are added (based on data from Keller
(2000)):
(2) a. Which friend has Thomas painted a picture of?
b. Which friend Thomas has painted a picture of?
c. Which friend Thomas have painted a picture of?
d. Which friend Thomas have painted a picture of her?
In (2b), the non-inverted auxiliary lowers judgments, and this penalty is added to by the agreement
error in (2c), and by the presence of a resumptive pronoun in (2d). Although Sorace and Keller
(2005) do not report directly on the issue of super-additivity, the data suggest that such GCVs
do not combine super-additively, i.e. there is no steep drop-off in acceptability in 2 vs. 1 or 3 vs.
2 GCVs. It thus remains to be seen whether sources of unacceptability in judgment tasks ever
combine to yield super-additive effects. The experimental studies described below are accordingly
aimed at determining whether and under what conditions such effects occur.
The second component of our investigation relates individual cognitive differences to judgment
data. Here, the relevant question is how, if at all, do measures of these cognitive capacities relate
to judgments for hard-to-process or complex sentences? In principle, there are several distinct ways
that any particular measure of individual cognitive differences might relate to judgments for such
sentences:
– Individuals with greater (or faster) resources provide higher judgments for complex sentences
than their low-resource counterparts;
– Individuals with greater resources rate sentences with any perceived abnormalities (i.e. any-
thing that triggers an acceptability penalty) as being worse than their lower resource coun-
terparts would;
– No systematic relationship exists between the measure of cognitive capacity and judgments
A recent exploration of this topic by Sprouse et al. (2012) found that two measures of individual
cognitive differences — the n-back task and a serial recall task — bore no systematic relationship to
acceptability judgments for the magnitude of syntactic island effects. The absence of a correlation
led Sprouse et al. to conclude that island effects do not derive from processing complexity. As
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noted in the response of Hofmeister, Staum Casasanto, and Sag (2012a), a drawback of this study
is that there is no body of evidence to indicate how these two measures relate to judgments for
hard-to-process sentences generally. It could be, for instance, that no matter what kind of sentence
is tested, these two measures of memory lack any relationship to the supplied judgments (for fur-
ther criticisms, see Hofmeister et al. (2012a) and Hofmeister, Staum Casasanto, and Sag (2012b)).
In short, we simply do not know if acceptability judgments ever systematically relate to measures
of individual cognitive differences (and there may well be significant differences across measures).
While it is possible that individuals who score higher on neuropsychological assessments of cogni-
tive properties like memory will be less strained by the demands of complex sentences and thus
provide higher acceptability judgments, this hypothesis requires confirmation with each measure of
individual cognitive differences and an array of sentences differing in complexity. A major objective
of this research, therefore, is to determine if and how individual differences in processing limitations
influence judgments for different types of sentences.
1.1 On the processing/grammar divide
While examining how processing limitations are manifested in judgment data, we remain agnostic
about how grammatical constraints and processing limitations relate. We do not assume that all
grammatical constraints have their origin in functional considerations, or that the two are fun-
damentally distinct. Instead, we are sampling from the kind of examples linguists standardly
characterize in terms other than processing costs (i.e. grammar) and from those characterized in
terms of processing costs to identify what distinguishing effects processing limitations have on ac-
ceptability judgments. If there are no observable differences, we could not draw strong conclusions
about the uniformity of “performance” and “competence” factors, as such a conclusion would hinge
upon null results. Conversely, the observation of contrastive patterns by itself is not confirmation
of categorical differences, even if consistent with such an interpretation. Such observations leave
open the possibility that two sets of stimuli fall along a single spectrum but with sufficient distance
that they appear to belong to entirely separate categories, much like the difference between voiced
and non-voiced consonants with the same place and manner of articulation, e.g. /p/ vs. /b/. In
short, our work does not speak to the degree of autonomy between grammatical constraints and
processing-related constraints.
In the following sections, we describe experiments testing how PCs combine to affect judgments
(Experiment 1), how GCVs combine to affect judgments (Experiments 2a & 2b), and how the two
interact (Experiment 3). In the final experiment, we assess how generalizable the results are by
examining a case of extreme processing difficulty.
2 Gathering Acceptability Judgments
To acquire acceptability ratings, we used the thermometer judgment (TJ) methodology described
in Featherston (2008), which resembles the Magnitude Estimation (ME) technique of gathering
judgments. In ME experiments, participants are asked to rate the magnitude of acceptability
difference between test items and a reference sentence (e.g. twice as good, three times as good, half
as good, etc.) (Bard, Robertson, & Sorace 1996; Sorace & Keller 2005).
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There are several differences, however, between the ME and TJ methodologies. In the latter,
participants are not instructed to evaluate test items in terms of the magnitude of acceptability
compared to the reference item, as evidence shows that participants ignore these instructions and
rate sentences in terms of their linear distance from the reference (Featherston 2008). In TJ studies,
participants judge items relative to two reference sentences in terms of linear distance. One of these
references is quite good and the other quite bad, and we follow Featherston (2008) in assigning these
sentences the arbitrary values 20 and 30. For all of our experiments, we used the same reference
sentences:
(3) a. The way that the project was approaching to the deadline everyone wondered. = 20
b. The architect told his assistant to bring the new plans to the foreman’s office. = 30
Test sentences were presented to participants on a computer screen one word at a time for a fixed
duration via the DMDX software package (Forster & Forster 2003). The duration varied with
the number of characters in the word (250 ms + 33.34 * number of characters), so that longer
words remained visible for longer periods. We chose word-by-word presentation over full sentence
presentation to prevent participants from excessive introspection about the test sentences, and
auto-paced presentation rather than self-paced presentation to prevent differences in how long each
participant studied a given stimulus.
Each participant also completed a reading span task during the same session to assess their
memory span (Daneman & Carpenter 1980). We used this memory span task largely because of
the rich history of its use, the extensive body of literature on the underlying cognitive constructs,
and its strong relationship to measures of listening and reading comprehension (Just & Carpenter
1992; Towse, Hitch, & Hutton 2000; Vos, Gunter, Schriefers, & Friederici 2001; Whitney, Arnett,
Driver, & Budd 2001; Friedman & Miyake 2004; Conway et al. 2005; Daneman & Hannon 2007).4
We scored each test using the partial credit method outlined in Conway et al. (2005): successful
recall of a word in a study list counts toward the final reading span score, even if the entire item
set was not recalled correctly. This method provides a greater range of reading span scores and
differentiates individuals more than methods that only describe the maximum recall level reached.
Prior to statistical analysis, we computed z-scores for each subject on the basis of all data in
the experimental data set (except practice items), including fillers. This reduces the impact of
varying uses of the interval scale by subjects. Finally, we excluded data points with z-scores more
than 2.5 standard deviations from each condition mean. For Experiment 1, this outlier removal
process affected 2.3% of the data. The resulting z-scores constitute the data on which we conducted
statistical analyses.
For all experiments, we used linear mixed effects models to estimate the effects of the exper-
imental manipulations (Baayen 2004, 2007). This method of statistical analysis also allows for
the evaluation of additional factors such as reading span score alongside effects due to direct ex-
perimental manipulation. Prior to analysis, all predictors were centered – higher order variables
(interactions) were also based on these centered predictors.
4The reading span task most likely taps other aspects of cognition besides memory, including attention (Whitney
et al. 2001; Conway et al. 2005, inter alia). Our findings here thus potentially speak to individual differences in
cognitive ability besides memory. We take this as an advantage of our approach, however, as we do not treat all
processing difficulty in sentence processing as being reflective of memory retrieval difficulty.
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For each experiment, we utilized the maximal random effect structure that converged. That is,
for a design with two factors, F1 and F2, the random effect structure included random intercepts for
participants and items, as well as by-participant and by-item random slopes for each factor and the
interaction (F1 × F2). This type of design essentially parallels the logic of classical ANOVAs, as it
acknowledges that the effect of treatment conditions may vary across experimental participants and
items. In our studies, all such models successfully converged, making it unnecessary to drop any
terms from the random effect structure specifications. Although models with nested random effect
structures do not directly yield p-values, significance at the .05 level can be conservatively estimated
for fixed effects coefficients with t-values which have absolute values at or above 2 (Baayen 2008;
Baayen, Davidson, & Bates 2008; Pinheiro & Bates 2000).
3 Experiment 1: Processing Difficulty
In this experiment, we evaluate how judgments of acceptability are affected by increasing the number
of distinct sources of processing difficulty. We also ask if and how individual differences, as measured
by the reading span task, relate to judgments for these sentences with varying degrees of processing
costs.
3.1 Participants
32 Stanford University students participated in exchange for payment. All self-identified as native
speakers of English.
3.2 Materials
We utilized 24 items from Grodner and Gibson (2005), who manipulated the distance between two
dependent arguments and their syntactic head. In these items, the hierarchical distance between
a subject and object noun phrase and their subcategorizing verb was varied. This was achieved
by varying (i) the presence/absence of a relative clause between the subject and verb (4a)/(4c) vs.
(4b)/(4d) and (ii) positioning the object NP immediately after the verb or before the subject NP
by relativizing it:
(4) a. [short-short] The nurse from the clinic supervised the administrator who scolded the
medic while a patient was brought into the emergency room.
b. [long-short] The nurse who was from the clinic supervised the administrator who
scolded the medic while a patient was brought into the emergency room.
c. [short-long] The administrator who the nurse from the clinic supervised scolded the
medic while a patient was brought into the emergency room.
d. [long-long] The administrator who the nurse who was from the clinic supervised
scolded the medic while a patient was brought into the emergency room.
These items were selected because reading time evidence from Grodner & Gibson (2005) shows that
increasing the hierarchical distance in examples like these leads to slower processing at the critical
integration sites (the verb scolded in (4) above). Moreover, increasing subject and object distance
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Figure 1: Mean acceptability z-scores from Experiment 1. Error bars show +/- 1 standard error.
simultaneously, as in the long-long condition, led to the slowest overall reading times. The 24
experimental items appeared with 72 fillers (24 of which were the items for Experiment 3). Each
participant saw only one condition of each item. The order of the materials was pseudo-randomized
by DMDX.
3.3 Procedure
Each session began with four practice trials to familiarize participants with the rating task and the
TJ scale. In the practice and main experimental session, each sentence was presented word-by-word,
after which a new screen repeated the reference sentences. A comprehension question followed this
judgment stage as a further motivator for participants to read the test sentences. Immediately
after the acceptability task, participants completed the reading span task. All participants saw
exactly the same sentences in the reading span task in the same order. Moreover, each participant
completed all levels of difficulty on the reading span task, regardless of their recall accuracy.
3.4 Results
Additivity : Both distance manipulations produce main effects — subject distance and object dis-
tance lower judgments. In addition, these factors interact significantly (see Table 1). As Figure 1
depicts, the acceptability decrement produced by two processing costs is greater than the sum of
the decrements produced by each cost in isolation.
Individual Differences : Reading span score is also a highly significant predictor of acceptability
scores. In particular, higher reading span scores predict higher judgment scores. As Figure 2 shows,
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Coffecients Standard Error t-value
SubjDistance −0.320 0.063 −5.05
ObjDistance −0.255 0.061 −4.21
SubjDistance × ObjDistance −0.432 0.103 −4.18
Reading span 0.057 0.015 3.82
Reading span × SubjDistance 0.002 0.025 0.07
Reading span × ObjDistance 0.094 0.026 3.66
Reading span × SubjDistance ×
ObjDistance
−0.005 0.046 −0.12
Table 1: Fixed effect summary for Experiment 1
this effect is driven by the conditions with longer dependencies between the object and verb – the
most difficult to process conditions, according to Grodner & Gibson (2005) and corroborated by
Bartek, Lewis, Vasishth, and Smith (2011) – which is reflected by the significant interaction of
reading span score and the object distance manipulation.
3.5 Discussion
According to the results, processing costs may have only minor effects on acceptability in isolation,
yet have highly significant effects on judgments when combined. Increasing the distance between a
single dependent argument and its head only lowered judgments slightly. But when we simultane-
ously increased the hierarchical distance of both dependents to their syntactic head, a sharp drop
in acceptability judgments occurred. Consequently, these data provide positive evidence that there
can be super-additive consequences for judgments when multiple PCs co-occur, at least under some
circumstances. This means that judgment data can reflect processing limitations, and not simply
processing costs, as evidenced by the super-additive effects. As far as we know, this is the first data
to show that unambiguous processing costs can yield super-additive effects in acceptability data.
The second finding is that individuals with higher reading spans provided higher acceptability
judgments for the most difficult-to-process conditions, based on self-paced reading and eye-tracking
data from Grodner and Gibson (2005) and Bartek et al. (2011). In sentences where the processing
demands were less, individual differences played little role in judgment variation. This suggests
that sentence processing complexity modulates the relationship between reading span scores and
acceptability scores: greater processing complexity leads to a more positive slope between reading
span and acceptability scores (but see the results of Experiment 4).
Whether or not these features are specific to sentences whose unacceptability relates to process-
ing costs, however, depends on whether similar relationships appear in sentences with GCVs. This
is the subject of the next series of experiments.
4 Experiment 2a: Separate Grammatical Violations
Experiment 2a evaluates how multiple GCVs affect judgments when they co-occur in the same
sentence. The objective here is to compare such a scenario with the effects of multiple PCs within a
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Figure 2: Effects of reading span score on acceptability z-score for each condition in Experiment 1,
according to ordinary least squares regression modeling
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single sentence, as well as the relationship between reading span scores and judgments for sentences
with varying numbers (and types) of GCVs.
Some long-standing assumptions about the nature of GCVs, in fact, lead us to anticipate a
different configuration of results in Experiment 2. Unlike the case of PCs, we know of no claims
that GCVs combine in a super-additive fashion. Such an account would imply that a GCV is
intensified (i.e. violations become more egregious) in the context of another GCV. Moreover, to
the extent that GCVs lower ratings for reasons other than processing/memory costs, there is little
reason to expect that the severity of GCVs varies across speakers of differing memory capacities.
Thus, if sentences with GCVs are unacceptable for reasons other than processing costs, estimates
of cognitive ability such as the reading span should relate differently to judgments of sentences with
GCVs compared to those with PCs.
4.1 Participants
Stanford University students (n = 28) who had not participated in Experiment 1 completed this
experiment in exchange for payment.
4.2 Materials
The 24 experimental items in Experiment 2a contained either zero, one, or two GCVs. We manip-
ulated the grammaticality of two separate but nearby constituents to yield a 2 x 2 design. The first
manipulation targeted the morphological form of a verb in a subject relative clause. Subjects either
saw the correct form (5a)/(5b) or they saw a form that was missing the appropriate inflectional
morphology (5c)/(5d). Additionally, participants either read an object pronoun with the proper
case-marking (5b)/(5d) or they read a pronoun with unlicensed nominative case-marking (5a)/(5c):
(5) a. [good-bad]: The friend who visited Sue asked she whether the value of the house had
dropped since the recession began.
b. [good-good]: The friend who visited Sue asked her whether the value of the house
had dropped since the recession began.
c. [bad-bad]: The friend who visit Sue asked she whether the value of the house had
dropped since the recession began.
d. [bad-good]: The friend who visit Sue asked her whether the value of the house had
dropped since the recession began.
72 filler items appeared along with the critical items. As in the previous experiment, all items were
followed by comprehension questions.
4.3 Procedure
Procedure was identical to Experiment 1. Data were analyzed using the same methods as in
Experiment 1. Outlier removal affected 0.89% of the data.
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Coffecients Standard Error t-value
Finiteness −0.506 0.082 −6.16
Case −0.726 0.106 −6.86
Finiteness × Case 0.268 0.134 1.99
Reading span −0.008 0.040 −0.21
Reading span × Finiteness 0.048 0.039 1.23
Reading span × Case −0.103 0.047 −2.17
Reading span × Finiteness ×
Case
0.009 0.089 0.10
Table 2: Fixed effect summary for Experiment 2a
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Figure 3: Mean acceptability z-scores from Experiment 2a. Error bars show +/- 1 standard error.
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4.4 Results
Additivity : Both inflectional morphology and case errors significantly lower acceptability judgments,
as Table 2 indicates. These factors also interact marginally, because the two GCVs in combination
yield an acceptability decrement that is less than the sum of the decrements caused by each error
in isolation, as seen in Figure 3.
Individual differences : No main effect of reading span was found for these stimuli. For the conditions
judged the worst by participants (those with either a case error or a case error and an inflectional
error), however, reading span scores exhibit a negative linear relationship with z-scores (see Figure
4). That is, individuals judge these conditions as being even worse than individuals with lower
reading span scores do. This difference between the conditions leads to a statistically reliable
interaction of reading span score and the case manipulation.
4.5 Discussion
In contrast to the results of combining PCs in Experiment 1, combining GCVs did not result in
super-additive effects; the effect of two co-occurring, proximal violations did not reduce judgments
further than expected on the basis of each violation in isolation. In fact, the results suggest the
opposite: a slightly smaller decrement than expected when the two GCVs co-occur. As Sorace &
Keller (2005) note, similar findings of cumulativity (i.e. GCVs ‘stacking’ up) occur with constraints
on word order and gapping (Keller 2000), as well as selectional restrictions and subcategorization
requirements (Chapman 1974). It thus appears to be true in a number of cases that respondents
factor multiple GCVs into their judgments. But in none of the cases cited is there evidence that
combining GCVs results in a super-additive acceptability penalty—all known cases result in either
additive or under-additive decrements.
The other important contrast between the first two experiments involves the relationship between
reading span scores and acceptability scores. We found a positive linear relationship between the two
for sentences with relatively high processing difficulty in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2a, higher
reading spans were associated with lower judgments for the conditions receiving the lowest mean
judgments (those with a case error), while there was essentially no relationship between reading
spans and judgments for sentences with inflectional errors.5
In order to interpret the results of Experiment 2a as being truly contrastive with those of
Experiment 1, it is necessary to rule out a skeptical interpretation. The two violations occur on
different words in Experiment 2a, whereas the processing manipulations affected the processing of
the same word in Experiment 1. Experiment 2b is consequently designed to evaluate what happens
when the violations are triggered by the same word.
5Because of the fact that this inflectional error results from missing material, it is possible that the weaker
acceptability effect is connected to the saliency or perceptibility of the “error”. This possibility is a further motivation
for Experiment 2b, where both GCVs follow from illicit additional material.
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Figure 4: Effects of reading span score on acceptability z-score for each condition in Experiment
2a, according to ordinary least squares regression modeling
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5 Experiment 2b: Contemporaneous Grammatical Violations
5.1 Participants
University of California - San Diego undergraduate students (n = 24) who had not participated in
Experiment 2a completed this experiment for course credit.
5.2 Materials
To create conditions where multiple grammatical violations could emerge at once, we manipulated
(i) the agreement between a dislocated wh-phrase (e.g. which manufacturers) and a verb heading
a complement clause (e.g. make vs. makes) and (ii) the presence of the complementizer that at
the beginning of the complement clause. The overt complementizer’s adjacency to the empty
embedded subject (or subject trace) position incurs a grammatical penalty (i.e. this violates the
Empty Category Principle (Chomsky 1981, 1986) or some principle with the same force). In (6d),
the verb makes not only disagrees in number with which manufacturers, but it also triggers a
that-trace violation (‘*’ indicates a violation of a grammatical constraint).
(6) a. [that-agr]: I was shocked to see which manufacturers the consumer report indicated
make reliable and safe automobiles.
b. [*that-agr] : I was shocked to see which manufacturers the consumer report indicated
that make reliable and safe automobiles.
c. [that-*agr]: I was shocked to see which manufacturers the consumer report indicated
makes reliable and safe automobiles.
d. [*that-*agr]: I was shocked to see which manufacturers the consumer report indicated
that makes reliable and safe automobiles.
76 filler items appeared along with these items.
5.3 Procedure
Procedure was identical in all aspects to that used in the previous experiments. Outlier removal
affected 0.69% of the data.
5.4 Results
Additivity : Unsurprisingly, both types of GCV lower acceptability judgments – agreement errors
and that-trace violations. These variables did not significantly interact (see Table 3).
Individual differences : Reading span scores only show a marginal relationship to acceptability scores,
according to the results. Specifically, reading span and the grammaticality of the number agreement
marginally interact. This is due to the fact, as seen in Figure 5, that only when another error is
present – that is, the least acceptable condition with both a that-trace error and an agreement error
– is there a negative linear relationship between reading span scores and judgments.
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Coffecients Standard Error t-value
That-trace −0.248 0.105 −2.36
Agreement −0.240 0.070 −3.44
That-trace × Agreement 0.185 0.132 1.40
Reading span 0.009 0.028 0.31
Reading span × That-trace −0.053 0.058 −0.91
Reading span × Agreement −0.077 0.042 −1.84
Reading span × That-trace ×
Agreement
−0.064 0.078 −0.82
Table 3: Fixed effect summary for Experiment 2b
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Figure 5: Effects of reading span score on acceptability z-score for each condition in Experiment
2b, according to ordinary least squares regression modeling
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Figure 6: Mean acceptability z-scores from Experiment 2b for conditions with varying processing
complexity. Error bars show +/- 1 standard error.
5.5 Discussion
As in Experiment 2a, each GCV lowered judgments and the violations combined additively when
they co-occured. This pattern emerged despite the violations occur being triggered by the same
lexical item. In contrast to Experiment 2a, though, GCVs combined additively in this experiment
— there was no strong evidence of an interaction. So, both additivity and under-additivity are
possible results from combining GCVs. Of primary importance here, however, is that there is no
indication that multiple GCVs lead to super-additive decrements.
This experiment also provides suggestive evidence of a relationship between reading span scores
and acceptability judgments similar to the one found in Experiment 2a: individuals with higher
reading span scores judge sentences with GCVs more harshly than individuals with lower reading
span scores. Again, the critical point is that sentences with GCVs yield a pattern with reading
span scores that is the opposite of what sentences with PCs demonstrate.6
6 Experiment 3: Grammar and Processing
Because the two types of manipulations — PCs vs. GCVs — were investigated in separate exper-
iments, the high- and low-reading span participants were different individuals across experiments
and the limitations of make conclusions based on effects with entirely different items, Experiment
6Because our focus is on the manifestation of processing limitations in acceptability judgments and not how
grammatical constraints relate to judgment data, we do not dwell on the question of why some sentences with
GCVs are rated lower by those with higher reading span scores. Nonetheless, we offer some speculation in the final
discussion section.
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Coffecients Standard Error t-value
Difficulty −0.097 0.058 −1.66
Grammaticality −0.738 0.074 −9.97
Difficulty × Grammaticality 0.310 0.082 3.79
Reading span −0.008 0.015 −0.53
Reading span × Difficulty −0.006 0.020 −0.29
Reading span × Grammaticality −0.087 0.030 −2.95
Reading span × Difficulty ×
Grammaticality
−0.019 0.038 −0.50
Table 4: Fixed effect summary for Experiment 3
3 consequently looks at how reading span scores relate to judgments for contrasting items (PCs
vs. GCVs) with the same subjects and items.
6.1 Participants
The materials for this experiment appeared in the same session as Experiment 1 and were rated by
the same 32 Stanford University students.
6.2 Materials
Experimental items appeared with either a correctly inflected verb (7a, 7b) or an incorrectly in-
flected verb (7c, 7d). Dependency locality was utilized again to vary processing difficulty; the
wh-dependencies in (7b) & (7d) are shorter than those in (7a) & (7c) and consequently presumed
to be easier to process.
(7) a. [hard-good] They couldn’t remember which lawyer that the reporter interviewed had
defended the elderly man at the courthouse.
b. [easy-good] They couldn’t remember which lawyer had defended the elderly man that
the reporter interviewed at the courthouse.
c. [hard-bad] They couldn’t remember which lawyer that the reporter interviewed had
defending the elderly man at the courthouse.
d. [easy-bad] They couldn’t remember which lawyer had defending the elderly man that
the reporter interviewed at the courthouse.
6.3 Procedure
Procedure and data analysis was the same as in the previous experments. Removal of outliers
affected 1.4% of the dataset.
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Figure 7: Mean acceptability z-scores from Experiment 3
6.4 Results
According to the results, improperly inflected verbs significantly lower judgments (see Table 4).7 In
contrast, the effect of processing difficulty on judgments is not statistically significant; however, there
is a significant interaction between processing difficulty and grammaticality. As Figure 7 illustrates,
this interaction arises because processing difficulty lowers judgments in sentences without GCVs,
but it does not do so in sentences with GCVs.
While reading span does not emerge as a significant predictor for judgments across all condition
types, this is because the grammatical and ungrammatical conditions pattern in different ways.
Individuals with higher reading span scores assign lower ratings to sentences with GCVs, but in
the grammatical conditions, higher reading span scores are associated with higher acceptability
judgments, leading to a significant interaction of reading span score and grammaticality, as shown
in Table 4. In other words, reading span scores only show a positive linear relationship with
judgments in the absence of GCVs.
6.5 Discussion
The data show that PCs and GCVs combine under-additively: combining the two sources of unac-
ceptability yields something less than expected on the basis of each in isolation. A likely explanation
for this under-additivity is that the GCV effectively drowns out effects of the PC. In general, if
7As an anonymous reviewer notes, participants may perceive these sentences as being unnatural, not because of
inflectional problems, but because they parse ”defending the elderly man at the courthouse” as an NP, e.g. “The
lawyer had defending the elderly man at the courthouse on his calendar”. Whether this is the preferred or less
preferred parse, it still yields an ungrammaticality as an obligatory constituent would still be missing in our items.
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Figure 8: Effects of reading span score on acceptability z-score, according to ordinary least squares
regression modeling
a grammatical constraint does not depend on processing difficulty, combining this constraint with
processing challenges should not result in super-additivity, according to the logic of the additive
factors model. The present results support this hypothesis.
Echoing the findings of the previous experiments, participants with higher reading span scores
find ungrammatical sentences worse, but difficult sentences better, compared to their low span
counterparts. The documentation of these contrasting effects for the same set of subjects adds
support to the similar contrasts found in Experiments 1 and 2a/2b: individuals with higher reading
span scores do not indiscriminately provide higher judgments for sentences with features that lower
acceptability compared to some baseline — only sentence features linked to processing difficulty
trigger this relationship.
7 Experiment 4: Extreme Sentence Processing Difficulty
Based on the evidence from Experiments 1-3, reading span tests seem to systematically relate to
judgments for sentences with varying degrees of processing complexity. However, these experiments
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do not tell us whether the observed patterns hold for sentences of all degrees of processing difficulty,
particularly extreme PCs. That is, do all acceptability contrasts that emerge from processing-related
sources demonstrate this sensitivity to individual characteristics like reading span? To address this
question, we consider constructions that give rise to severe processing difficulty, which may impose
such high cognitive demands that even individuals with quite high reading spans would encounter
serious parsing difficulty.
7.1 Participants
28 Stanford University undergraduates, na¨ıve to the purposes of the study, received cash for their
participation.
7.2 Materials
The materials (n = 24) for the experiment varied in two respects: (1) the distance between a
wh-phrase and its subcategorizing head and (2) the presence of either a subject or object relative
clause.
(8) a. [short-src] Someone figured out which politician wrote that Robert bribed a reporter
that trusted Nancy without thinking about it.
b. [short-orc] Someone figured out which politician wrote that Robert bribed a reporter
that Nancy trusted without thinking about it.
c. [long-src] Someone figured out which politician a reporter that trusted Nancy wrote
that Robert bribed without thinking about it.
d. [long-orc] Someone figured out which politician a reporter that Nancy trusted wrote
that Robert bribed without thinking about it.
Thus, in the long conditions, the wh-dependency crosses a nested object relative clause. In contrast,
the dependencies are non-overlapping in the short conditions.
7.3 Procedure
The procedure was identical to that used in the previous experiments. Outlier removal affected
1.49% of the data.
7.4 Results
As Figure 9 depicts, higher reading span scores are associated with higher acceptability z-scores in
the two relatively easy conditions with short dependencies, (7a) & (7b). But in the more difficult
conditions with long dependencies, (7c) & (7d), no evidence of a relationship between reading span
scores and judgments appears. This pattern accounts for the interaction between reading span scores
and dependency length in the LME model of acceptability judgments (see Table 5). Such findings
thus do not reveal a relationship between judgments and individual cognitive differences, despite
the clear fact that it is the processing difficulty of these items that yields the low acceptability
ratings.
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Figure 9: Effects of reading span score on acceptability z-score for each condition in Experiment 4,
according to ordinary least squares regression modeling
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Coffecients Standard Error t-value
Length −0.465 0.075 −6.19
RC-type −0.079 0.052 −1.52
Length× RC-type 0.076 0.106 0.71
Reading span 0.054 0.049 1.11
Reading span × Length −0.100 0.049 −2.03
Reading span × RC-type −0.039 0.034 −1.15
Reading span × Length × RC-
type
0.026 0.069 0.38
Table 5: Fixed effect summary for Experiment 4
7.5 Discussion
According to the results, individuals with relatively high reading span scores do not always rate
hard-to-process sentences as being more acceptable than individuals with lower reading span scores.
Thus, harder-to-process sentences will not necessarily show a stronger relationship with individual-
level memory characteristics than easier-to-process sentences.
Items with long, syntactically complex dependencies here seem to produce such extreme pro-
cessing difficulty that individual differences have little impact. Items with short dependencies, in
contrast, are comparatively easier to process, leaving room for differences due to individual varia-
tion to emerge. Thus, the relationship between memory capacity and the judgment of items with
PCs may be absent at the edges of the difficulty spectrum. Judgments for trivially easy or ex-
tremely difficult items may show little relationship to individual differences because all or almost
all individuals behave in a virtually identical fashion at these extremes.
In sum, memory estimates and processing difficulty are not uniformly related across all types
of constructions in acceptability judgment tasks. Even if memory measures have the potential
to identify processing limitations at work in some acceptability judgment datasets, the absence
of correlations or linear relationships cannot license the conclusion that such limitations do not
influence acceptability judgments.
8 General Discussion
The purpose of these experimental studies is to augment our understanding of how processing limita-
tions are reflected in acceptability judgments. To do so, we explored acceptability datasets differing
with respect to the role of processing complexity in creating judgment contrasts. In Experiment
1, the critical items differed along a spectrum of processing complexity. The most difficult sen-
tences had a syntactic structure that complicated the retrieval and integration of two key argument
phrases. As compared to examples where the retrieval of only one such argument was complicated,
the simultaneous demands imposed by two relatively difficult long-distance dependencies resulted
in super-additive decrements in the acceptability judgment data. Variation in the judgment data
for the most difficult conditions also related to performance on a reading span test: individuals
who scored higher on this test provided higher ratings for the difficult items. Subsequent experi-
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ments indicated that these two effects (super-additivity and positive interactions between reading
span and sentence complexity) do not extend to other datasets where the source of unacceptabil-
ity can be attributed to factors other than processing complexity. In Experiments 2a and 2b, we
saw that multiple grammatical errors, whether simultaneously triggered or not, failed to produce
super-additive effects, and that the only significant interactions with reading span were negative,
i.e. higher reading span scores were associated with lower ratings for the least acceptable sentence
conditions. These patterns in the first two experiments were replicated in Experiment 3 where the
two sources of unacceptability combined under-additively, and showed contrasting relationships to
reading span scores.
On the view that processing costs are not central to the unacceptability of sentences with GCVs,
the evidence suggests that how sources of unacceptability combine and how reading span scores
relate to judgments depends on the role of processing limitations in judgment variation. Evidence
of super-additive interactions together with a positive relationship between judgments and reading
span scores strongly implies that processing difficulty plays a large role. In contrast, additive or
non-additive cumulativity together with either a flat or negative relationship between judgments
and reading span scores suggest a relatively small role for processing limitations in the judgment
variation. This is consistent with a gradient perspective of the observed findings: the greater the
magnitude of super-additive interactions, and the greater the positivity of the relationship between
reading span scores and judgments, the more that processing limitations play a role in the judgment
data.
In sum, these data supply novel evidence that (a) processing costs can produce super-additive
effects on acceptability judgments and (b) unlike other factors that lower acceptability, processing
costs can show a positive relationship to individual measures of processing resources like the reading
span. Taken together, these tell-tale signs of processing limitations can be used as a tool in inter-
preting judgment data, particularly when the primary driver of acceptability contrasts is ambiguous
or unknown. Like most tools, though, this one too is limited, as Experiment 4 showed. Indeed,
because super-additive effects are limited to contexts where resource demands are overlapping, this
particular indicator of processing limitations will apply only to a specific sort of ‘hard-to-process’
sentence. Relatedly, only a small subset of the many types of proposed grammatical constraints
and sources of processing difficulty have been considered here. The generalizability of the present
findings thus ultimately depends on whether further research confirms these findings in the consid-
eration of other sentence types.
8.1 Individual Differences and Acceptability Judgments
The evidence obtained here includes the finding that higher reading span scores are associated
with higher judgments for complex (but grammatically well-formed) sentences. In Experiment 1,
this trend emerged starkly in the most difficult conditions, according to independent reading time
evidence (Bartek et al. 2011). In the easier conditions, where there was no embedding of the subject
NP, there was essentially no variation ascribable due to individual differences on the reading span
task (see Figure 2). This pattern is consistent with the view that individuals with higher reading
spans encounter the same absolute amount of difficulty, but generally have more or faster resources
to cope with these processing costs. As a consequence of being taxed less, proportionately speaking,
these individuals provide higher ratings for the critical sentences.
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In several respects, these findings resemble those of Just and Carpenter (1992). They also
obtained reading span scores from their participants and found that the magnitude of the processing
difference between subject vs. object relative clauses depended on the reading span bracket each
participant fell into. In brief, they discovered an interaction between reading span group (high
vs. low) and syntactic complexity, much as we observed in Experiment 1. On the other hand, the
findings of Caplan and Waters (1999) and Waters and Caplan (1996) point in the other direction:
Caplan and Waters were unable to replicate many of the key results of Just and Carpenter (1992),
and in other investigations, Caplan and Waters found no relationship between performance on the
reading span task and judgments for complex sentences. In particular, Waters and Caplan (1996)
tested how high-, medium-, and low-span participants judged the acceptability of various garden
path sentences under whole-sentence visual presentation or rapid serial visual presentation in a
forced-choice (“good” or “bad”) task. All groups responded more slowly and less accurately to
garden path sentences, compared to non-garden path sentences. However, the magnitude of these
differences did not vary across the groups. Perhaps most compellingly, individuals with severe
memory impairments, as reflected by reading spans of 0 or 1, behaved no differently than control
groups in the reading of subject and object relative clause sentences.
There are several possible explanations for these conflicting findings. One concerns coding and
categorization of the individual participants. Waters and Caplan employed the traditional method
of scoring the reading span according to the maximum level a participant reached on the task.
As Conway et al. (2005) observe, this all-or-nothing scoring strategy obliterates useful information
about individual variation. Moreover, by lumping individuals into high, medium, or low working
memory bins, Waters and Caplan reduce the statistical probability of finding effects. A second
concerns the type or source of processing difficulty. The Waters and Caplan (1996) study cited
above centers on garden path effects, where the observable processing difficulty can be attributed
to reanalysis and expectations given the bottom-up input. This situation differs markedly from the
cases considered where the online difficulty is standardly attributed to memory retrieval difficulty.
Thus, it remains a possibility that different sources of processing difficulty have notably different
signature effects on acceptability judgments and that they have different relationships to measures
of memory capacity, such as the reading span task.
Lastly, although one measure of individual differences, the reading span task, relates system-
atically to judgments for some complex sentences, this by no means implies that similar results
will obtain with other measures. As noted earlier, other researchers have looked for a relationship
between memory measures and judgments for particular types of sentences, and have failed to un-
cover any reliable patterns (Tokimoto 2009; Sprouse et al. 2012). However, these null results are
reconcilable with the view that inappropriate measures of individual differences were chosen, that
the participant sample reflects an insufficiently wide range of memory spans, that the materials
themselves are too extreme to allow individual differences to emerge, or that other confounds ob-
scure the critical effects. Thus, the current results and conclusions about individual differences and
their relationship to judgments apply only to the reading span task.
8.2 The Processing of Grammatical Constraint Violations
The strength of the conclusions made here depends on the assumption that certain sentences are
unacceptable for reasons other than online processing difficulty. This assumption is unlikely to
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provoke much outcry. But it leaves the lingering question of why multiple GCVs do not combine
super-additively, since there must be some mental effort used in identifying and processing them.
The explanation for this depends on how one conceptualizes the link between grammatical and
general cognitive constraints. Tanenhaus, Carlson, and Seidenberg (1985), for instance, state that at
least some linguistic processes are modular and depend on automatic processes that are “extremely
rapid, they are sealed off from awareness and not subject to strategic control, and they do not
draw on processing resources” (p. 367). From this highly modular perspective, the processing of
GCVs is free from the sort of limitations that affect the processing of PCs. Super-additive effects
are consequently predicted to be absent, as linguistic modules recruit different kinds of cognitive
processes and do not suffer from the same sort of limitations as the general system, thus making it
effectively impossible for the module to be overtaxed.
On the contrasting view that grammar and processing difficulty lie on a continuum, the lack of
super-additive effects from combining GCVs can be taken as an indication of minimal processing
costs. That is, if grammatical constraints reflect highly overlearned generalizations about regulari-
ties in the structure of linguistic input based on previous experience (MacWhinney 1998; Kemmer
& Barlow 2000; Langacker 2000; Bod 2006, 2009; Goldberg 2006; Bybee 2007), then multiple gram-
matical errors are unlikely to combine in a super-additive fashion simply because they are trivial to
process.
A similar reasoning can be applied to the individual difference results. It is not surprising that
judgments rise for individuals with higher reading span scores if these individuals experience less
sensitivity to processing costs (up to some threshold of difficulty). On either perspective outlined
above, such a linear relationship is predictably absent when grammatical errors appear in the input:
the assessment of grammatical constraints, whether learned over a lifetime or part of a discrete
language module, does not significantly tax general processing resources. This is either because the
relevant language processing module operates without the limitations the general cognitive system
abides by or because the relevant morphosyntactic regularities are highly overlearned and trivial to
evaluate.8
8.3 Conclusion
It is useful to conclude with what our results do and do not show. What they tell us is how some
processing-related sources of unacceptability affect judgments and relate to reading span scores,
and relatedly, they allow us to roughly gauge the extent of processing limitations in acceptability
judgment variation. What they do not do, however, is tell us how to know that processing-related
sources of unacceptability are not present in an acceptability contrast, that unacceptability follows
solely from grammatical constraints, or that grammar has no role to play in a given contrast.
Even when we find super-additivity and/or a positive linear relationship between judgments and
measures of memory/verbal abilities, these findings cannot definitively rule out the possibility that
grammar or other factors account for some observable part of the variation in judgments. Given
our current state of knowledge, it appears to be impossible to rule out grammar as a contributor
8We consider it probable that grammatical violations are not homogenous with respect to their associated process-
ing costs. Some violations, for instance, may be more obvious, or more ‘repairable’ than others. Thus, the comments
above apply specifically to the sorts of violations we have looked at here.
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to an acceptability contrast.9 There may be cases where we have no theoretical reason to suppose
that GCVs are responsible for low judgments of acceptability, e.g. center embeddings, garden path
sentences, etc. But this is quite different from having empirical evidence that proves a negative—a
difficult task in any scientific endeavor.
On the other hand, finding support for the role of factors unrelated to general cognitive costs
is more straightforward. We would need data showing that judgment ratings get lower as pro-
cessing gets easier. If evidence from processing difficulty measures and acceptability tasks show
that sentences become less acceptable in conditions where processing becomes easier (relative to
some baseline condition), online sentence processing difficulty becomes an unlikely explanation for
the acceptability pattern. Assuming that grammar and processing difficulty are the primary or
only candidates to explain such acceptability contrasts, then such data strengthen the case for
grammatical explanations.
As an example of a study that reaches such a conclusion, Staum Casasanto and Sag (2008) find
that repetition of the word that lowers acceptability judgments in sentences like (9):
(9) I truly wish that if something like that were to happen that my children would do something
like that for me.
However, when the distance between the first and second complementizer that is greater, the ac-
ceptability decrement is less severe. Hypothesizing that the second that may have some functional
value, Staum Casasanto & Sag looked at reading times for similar items. In this case, reading times
at the relative clause subject (my children) were faster after a repeated that compared to sentences
with only the initial that. These findings support the idea that the second that facilitates processing,
but they do not parallel the acceptability findings: the cases where the extra that helps processing
still receive lower acceptability judgments than the single-that cases. Hence, it makes little sense
to suppose that processing effort makes sentences with a repeated that unacceptable. Instead, this
data pattern supports the conclusion that the repeated that violates a grammatical principle, al-
though the severity of the accompanying acceptability decrement can be modulated by functional
considerations. In short, the same factor that introduces a grammatical error may simultaneously
aid online sentence processing.
The motivation to continue with such investigations is aptly summarized by Bever (1970): “Lin-
guistic intuitions do not necessarily reflect the structure of a language, yet such intuitions are the
9A reviewer makes a similar point by noting that super-additive effects are ambiguous between cases of interacting
demands on cognitive resources and cases where general cognitive demands additively summate but a third factor,
i.e. grammar, contributes an additional source of variation (see Sprouse 2007; Sprouse et al. 2012). We concur with
this logic, but we would make several observations in this regard. To the best of our knowledge, no acceptability
data exist yet that clearly portray the latter scenario, and our results would suggest that, even in such a case, the
extent of processing costs on judgments would be reflected in the correlation with reading span scores.
In addition, there is another way of addressing whether super-additive effects can be understood in terms of
grammatical constraint effects stacking on top of functional constraint effects. On such a scenario, two sentence
features, A & B, which independently lower judgments (for reasons due to processing complexity) happen to combine
in such a way that the sentence now violates a grammatical constraint. In other words, the ungrammaticality and
super-additivity results from the specific combination of A & B. To test whether this interpretation is sound, A & B
could each be combined with other established sentence processing factors that lower judgments in a separate series
of experiments to look for signs of super-additive effects on acceptability. If A & B combine with other sentence
features to yield super-additive effects in judgment datasets, then it is unlikely that the original super-additive effects
of combining A & B are idiosyncratic and specific to the co-presence of those two sentence features.
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basic data the linguist uses to verify his grammar. This fact could raise serious doubts as to whether
linguistic science is about anything at all, since the nature of the source of its data is so obscure”
(p. 346). Forty years of subsequent research has unfortunately witnessed sparingly few discoveries
about the factors that contribute to and shape acceptability judgments, or about how to distinguish
them from one another. In response, there are many who would abandon intuitions altogether as a
primary source of linguistic data. We are not among them. But at the very least, if introspective
judgments of sentence acceptability are to remain part of the data linguists use to construct theories
of grammar, it is essential that we explore explanations of complex patterns of graded acceptability
in terms of the interaction of grammatical constraints, limitations of processing resources, and other
factors outside the domain of grammar.
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